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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY
SENTENCE STATUTES
Courts in the United States have long had conflicting opinions concerning their authority to suspend criminal sentences. Some have held that
the authority comes from statutory enactments by the legislature' while
others have decided that legislative action is unnecessary because the
2
power is inherent within the judiciary.
Much of the conflicting opinion about the power to suspend sentence
stems from failure to distinguish between two meanings of the term. One
use of the phrase denotes a suspension of imposition of sentence where the
judge, after verdict, fails to hand down any sentence or waits until a later
time to sentence. The second use of the phrase means a suspension of
execution of sentence where the sentence is pronounced but then suspended. It is generally held that the court does have the inherent power
to suspend, at least temporarily, the imposition of sentence, but the con3
flict of opinion occurs when courts try to suspend execution indefinitely
without statutory permission.
The source of authority to suspend execution indefinitely becomes
crucial when a state legislature enacts a mandatory sentence statute, and
the constitutionality of this limitation on judicial discretion is then tested
on the ground that it is an encroachment upon the inherent power of the
judiciary. The problem is one concerning the separation of powers, as the
judiciary claims an inherent power to suspend while the legislature contends that only it has the power to allow suspension. Where the legislature
attempts to set a mandatory sentence, these contentions are brought into
sharp conflict.
The constitutionality of such a statute was questioned in the recent
Idaho case of State v. McCoy.4 The defendant was convicted in the pro'Madjorous v. State, 24 Ohio App. 146, 156 N.E. 916 (1924), affd, 113 Ohio St. 427,
149 N.E. 393 (1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 662 (1926).
2
People v. Goodrich, 149 N.Y.S. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
3
One author has said:
Probably one reason for the mass of conflicting opinion in other
jurisdictions was the failure of the courts. . . to recognize the logical point
in procedure at which this discretionary power of the courts could be
properly exercised without statutory authority. Instead of following the
Massachusetts practice of acting before sentence these courts exhausted
their power by imposing sentence, and then tried to suspend its execution,
which was beyond the judicial function until extended by statute.
Grinnell, The Common Law Historyof Probation,45 MASS. L.Q., Oct., 1960, at 87.
494 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971).
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bate court of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and his
sentence was suspended notwithstanding a statute specifically providing

that anyone convicted of driving under the influence must serve at least
ten days in jail.5 The prosecuting attorney sought a writ of mandate from
the district judge ordering the probate court to sentence the defendant, but
the writ was denied as the court found the statute to conflict with the
state's general probation statute 6 and three provisions of the state consti-

tution. 7 The state appealed, arguing that the legislature is given authority
to determine sentences for crimes, which authority includes the power to
prescribe mandatory sentences. The state further asserted that, while the
judiciary may have had the power to suspend sentences at common law,

that power'is not inherent and may be abrogated by statute.
A majority of the Idaho Supreme Court held that the judicial branch
had inherent power to suspend sentences and that the power could not be
withdrawn by the legislature. Relying on passages from Blackstone's
5

1daho Code Ann. § 49-1102(d) (Supp. 1970) provides that:
Every person who is convicted of a violation of this section shall be
punished by imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for not more
than six (6) months or by fine of not more than three hundred dollars
(S300) or by both such fine and imprisonment. Every person convicted
under this section shall serve at least ten (10) days in the county or municipal jail and this sentence shall be mandatory on every court of the state of
Idaho without any right to exercisejudicialdiscretion in said matter...
(Emphasis added).
OIDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2601 (Supp. 1970) reads:
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of
guilty, in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against
the laws of the state, except those of treason or murder, the court in its
discretion may:

2. Suspend the execution of the judgment at the time of judgment
or at any time during the term of a sentence in the county jail and place
the defendant on probation under such terms and conditions as it deems
necessary and expedient. ...
7
IDAHO CONST. art. II, § I divides the powers of the government into three branches
and provides that one branch may not exercise powers properly belonging to another unless
expressly permitted by the constitution. IDAHO CONST. art. II, § 19 provides that no local
or special laws may be passed. (This provision seems to be irrelevant to the problem.) IDAHO
CONST. Art. V, § 13 provides that the legislature may not deprive the judiciary of any power
rightly belonging to it but shall regulate by law proceedings in courts below the Supreme
Court of Idaho.

166

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

Commentaries' and Hale's Pleas of the Crown," the majority first held
that the judiciary did have power to suspend at common law. The court
conceded that if the power were substantive law, it could be abrogated by
statute,10 but it held that the power to suspend was of a higher order:
"Rather, it is in the nature of an inherent right of the judicial department
and one which the separation of powers concept in our system of government places above and beyond the rule of mandatory action imposed by
legislative fiat."'" The court also relied upon the New York case of People
ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions,2 where it was held that the judiciary
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *394. The pertinent passage is as follows:
The only other remaining ways of avoiding the execution of the judgment are by a reprieve or a pardon; whereof the former is temporary only,
the latter permanent.
I. A reprieve (from reprendre, to take back) is the withdrawing of a
sentence for an interval of time whereby the execution is suspended. This
may be, first, ex arbitriojudicis, either before or after judgment; as where
the judge is not satisfied with the verdict, or the evidence is suspicious, or
the indictment is insufficient, or he is doubtful whether the offence be
within clergy; or sometimes, if it be a small felony, or any favorable
circumstances appear in the criminal's character, in order to give room to
apply to the crown for either an absolute or conditional pardon. These
arbitrary reprieves may be granted or taken off by the justices of gaoldelivery, although their session be finished and their commission expired;
but this rather by common usage than of strict right.
12 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *412. The pertinent passage is as follows:
REPRIEVES, or stays of judgment or execution are of three kinds, viz.
84

II. Ex arbitriojudicis. Sometimes the judge reprieves before judgment, as where he is not satisfied with the verdict, or the evidence is
uncertain, or the indictment insufficient, or doubtful whether within clergy;
and sometimes after judgment, if it be a small felony, tho out of clergy,
or in order to a pardon or transportation. . . . [Tihese arbitrary reprieves
may be granted or taken off by the justices of gaol-delivery, altho their
sessions be adjourned or finished, and this by reason of common usage.
0
" IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-116 (1947):
Common law in force.-The common law of England, so far as it is
not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the
United States, in all cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the
rule of decision in all courts of this state.
"486 P.2d at 25 1.
12141 N.Y. 288, 36 N.E. 386 (1894). Although Forsyth held that courts had inherent
power to suspend imposition, the rule was expanded to cover suspension of execution in
People v. Goodrich, 149 N.Y.S. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1914). Goodrich was disapproved only three
years later in People ex rel.
Hirschberg v. Seeger, 179 App. Div. 792, 166 N.Y.S. 913 (1917)
which upheld Forsyth but said that once sentence had been pronounced, the power of the
trial court over the sentence was gone. Goodrich was specifically restored as authority
through questionable reasoning in Exparte Kuney, 168 Misc. 285, 5 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup.
Ct. 1938). The inherent power in the courts to suspend was further upheld in Hogan v.

1972]

CASE COMMENTS

did have the inherent power to suspend imposition of sentence. Further,
the Idaho majority held that "common sense"' 13 dictated the result that
the judiciary have discretion in sentending. 4 A dissenting justice pointed
out that this decision reversed the previous Idaho decision of Ex parte

Peterson, 5 where it had been said, without elaboration, that the trial
courts had no power to suspend execution of sentence absent an authorizing statute."
The ramifications of the result reached in the Idaho decision could be
of extreme importance if other state courts should accept its reasoning.

Statutes denying judicial discretion are common 17 and will of course, be
Bohan, 279 App. Div. 1044, 113 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1952), affd 305 N.Y. 110, 111 N.E.2d 233
(1953) and People ex rel. Galea v. McCoy, 27 Misc. 2d 850, 209 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Sup. Ct.
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 14 App. Div. 2d 979, 221 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961).
"486 P.2d at 251.
"Although, as pointed out in note 16 infra, there had been Idaho cases concerning
sentence suspension which were relied on by the dissenting justice, the majority chose not to
discuss these. Instead the court concentrated on other situations where it had been held that
the judiciary had inherent powers, such as Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 206 P.2d
528 (1949), where a statute regulating admission to the Idaho bar was stricken as an invalid
encroachment upon the judiciary, and R.E.W. Constr. Co. v. District Court, 88 Idaho 426,
400 P.2d 390 (1965), where the court upheld its own inherent power to promulgate rules of
procedure.
1519 Idaho 433, 113 P. 729 (1911). The case was cited with approval in Exparte United
States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916), which is discussed in text accompanying notes 18-27 infra.
"6See also Ex parte Grove, 43 Idaho 775, 254 P. 519 (1927), a case dealing with
suspension of imposition, where the court said:
Since the decisions in the Peterson and Ensign Cases relate to the suspension of a sentence already entered, they are not strictly in point on the
precise question here presented, to wit, the power to indefinitely withhold
the pronouncement of judgment on a plea of guilty. However, those decisions indirectly sustain the proposition that the courts possess no such
power, for like the power to indefinitely suspend the execution of judgment,
the power to indefinitely withhold the pronouncement of judgment is nothing more or less than the power to perpetually prevent punishment, which
the courts do not possess.
Id. at 520. This argument is similar to the fear expressed in Exparte United States, 242
U.S. 27 (1916), that if the courts had discretion to suspend sentence, they might use this
discretion, if not regulated, to thwart the law permanently.
State ex rel Conner v. Ensign, 38 Idaho 539, 223 P. 230 (1924), cited in Grove, held
that an annulment of sentence by the trial judge after part of it had been served was void.
The Grove case thus reinforces the Peterson holding that there was no inherent power to
suspend sentence. Later, in Exparte Jennings, 46 Idaho 142, 267 P. 227 (1928), where the
principal issue was whether defendant could be made to serve a sentence the execution of
which had been suspended, both parties agreed that the suspension itself was invalid.
"Idaho may have to declare others of her statutes unconstitutional, for example IDAHO
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stricken if it is found that the power of the courts to suspend is superior
to any action by the legislature decreeing otherwise.
This problem, however, will not arise by adopting the approach taken
in Exparte United States," where the United States Supreme Court held
that federal courts do not have any inherent power to suspend execution
of sentence for an indefinite length of time. The Court based its decision
on an interpretation of Hale" and Blackstone 20 under which it was admitted that courts at common law did have power to suspend execution
temporarily but not indefinitely. The Court further noted that both suspension of imposition and suspension of execution had been used to alleviate the harshness of the common law, which harshness had been made
more lenient in modern times by judicial review or new trial. But it did
not follow, the Court said, that because courts have discretion to suspend
execution temporarily, they have an inherent right permanently to refuse
to enforce the law. Further, it was pointed out that suspensions were
recognized in some states only as the result of prior habit,2' and this was
certainly little reason to let the practice continue. The conclusion drawn
was that if federal courts were to have authority to suspend execution,
Congress would have to give it.22
In those cases adopting the contrary rule, it has been argued that
"common sense" dictates the conclusion that courts have the inherent
power to suspend execution of sentence. 23 Rehabilitation, it is contended,
should be the primary consideration when imposing a criminal sentence;
that goal can best be fostered by the judge, the person most familiar with
the case. 24 The purpose of rehabilitation, it is urged, cannot be furthered
by allowing the legislature to do away with judicial discretion and thus
preventing the judge from weighing the special circumstances of each case.
The Supreme Court, in Exparte United States, seems to have anticiCODE ANN. § 19-2601 (Supp. 1970), which is quoted in note 6 supra. A court, under this
statute, cannot suspend sentence in murder or treason convictions. This prohibition is the
same denial of judicial discretion as was stricken in the principal case.
19242 U.S. 27 (1916).
"See note 9 supra.
2°See note 8 supra.
2t
See, e.g., People v. Goodrich, 149 N.Y.S. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1914). New York was one
such state.
22Even before the Supreme Court decision, the Eighth Circuit had reached the same
conclusion in Morgan v. Adams, 226 F. 719 (8th Cir. 1915).
Federal courts are given power to suspend sentence by 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964). This
power was first given by the Federal Probation Act, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259 (1925). In
Affronti v. United States, 350 U.S. 79 (1955), the Supreme Court held that the power of
the courts to grant probation comes purely from the legislature. For other federal cases
involving the validity of mandatory sentences, see Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356
(9th Cir. 1964); Lathem v. United States, 259 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v.
Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247, 251 (197 1).
uId.
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pated this reasoning. It realized that to function properly, a trial court
must be given some discretion, such as allowing sentence to be suspended
temporarily in order that the defendant might pursue a post-conviction
remedy. However, an overriding consideration led to the conclusion that
such discretion did not vest the court with the inherent right to refuse to
enforce the law.25 The Court said that if the judiciary were able to set aside
punishment prescribed by law upon considerations completely extraneous

to the conviction, they might also assume authority to permanently refuse
to try a person on the grounds that the act made criminal by law was not
of such a nature that sanctions should be imposed.
Carried to the extreme,
26
this view could leave no laws to be enforced.

The reasoning of the Supreme Court and other policy considerations
2'I7he Court stated:

But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to the power
here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce
begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the
effect of the proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by
the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime
is legislative ....
2Ohio courts have followed federal precedent, for instance, upholding a mandatory
sentence statute in Madjorous v. State, 24 Ohio App. 146, 156 N.E. 916 (1924), affd, 113
Ohio St. 427, 149 N.E. 292 (1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 662 (1926), where the court stated:
The General Assembly of Ohio, in the exercise of its prerogatives, has
passed laws permitting certain classes of offenders convicted of certain
crimes to be released upon parole by the trial court under certain conditions. These laws . . . have been the subject of great abuse by the trial

courts, with the result that many offenders have been paroled that the
General Assembly never intended to have paroled. ...
We believe that this was a mere declaration of what the law always
was before the passage of the parole acts. . . and when this law was passed
it was not an encroachment upon the powers of the judiciary.
We are aware that this question has been before the United States
Supreme Court and the courts of the several states of this country a great
many times, and we believe that a great deal of seeming confusion'in the
decisions has been brought about because of the failure to make the proper
distinction between the suspending or postponing of the imposition of a
sentence upon a prisoner, and the indefinite stay of execution of a sentence
theretofore pronounced by the court. As we understand the law, it has
always been conceded in this country that the trial court, in exercise of its
judicial discretion, had a right to postpone for a reasonable time the imposition of a sentence; and they also have been given the right to temporarily
suspend the execution of a sentence already imposed, in order to give the
accused an opportunity to have his case reviewed as provided by law. But
we do not understand that a trial court has ever had the right to postpone
indefinitely the execution of a sentence already imposed.
156 N.E. at 917. The state supreme court affirmed, citing Exparte United States and saying
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call for a result opposite to that reached by the Idaho court in McCoy.
The practice of suspending sentence seems to have come about when it
was badly needed from both a social and legal point of view. Punishment
for all but the most minor crimes was capital, and benefit of clergy, which
originated as the ecclesiastics' claim of exemption from secular court
criminal process, had been extended unevenly and was not available to all
classes.2Y Many forms of post-conviction relief or review which are available today were not known at common law. Today, states allow sentence
to be suspended in many circumstances, 28 and it thus seems unreasonable
to deny the legislature the right to direct that sentences shall be mandatory
in certain situations where they think the need exists.
It would seem from several of the cases on which the Idaho majority
relied2 that it failed to distinguish between suspension of imposition and
suspension of execution. However, the question may be raised if there is
any logical distinction between the two. The answer is that such a difference exists, because there must be some point in time where the trial court
loses its jurisdiction over the case unless given a continuing jurisdiction by
statute.30 The question becomes whether this point is after verdict, after
imposition of sentence or after sentence has begun to be served.
Logically, a court should be able to suspend imposition for a definite
period and not lose jurisdiction of the case because its task would not yet
be finished. However, after sentence has been imposed in a criminal case,
the work of the court is at its logical conclusion, and jurisdiction of the
matter should pass to others. The Idaho court might have been objecting
to the fact that the mandatory sentence statute seemed not to allow suspension of imposition, 31 but the decision is not clear on this matter. The
facts of the case, however, presented a situation where execution and not
imposition had been suspended, as the defendant had been sentenced to
thirty days in jail before suspension.
The majority spoke of "common sense" dictating that courts have the
that the inherent powers of a state court are no more than those of federal courts. Madjorous
v. State, 113 Ohio St. 427, 149 N.E. 393 (1925), affg 24 Ohio App. 146, 156 N.E. 916
(1924).
For similar results in other states, see Kelly v. Dewey, Ill Conn. 281, 149 A. 840
(1930); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 199 A.2d 809 (1964).
27See Grinnell, The Common Law History of Probation,45 MASS. L.Q., Oct., 1960,
at 87.
28E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-2209 (Repl. Vol. 1956).
2Gehrmann v. Osborne, 79 N.J. Eq. 430, 82 A. 424 (1912); People ex reL Forsyth v.
Court of Sessions, 141 N.Y. 288, 36 N.E. 386 (1894). In both of these cases, imposition
and not execution was suspended.
0See. e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 53-272 (1950), which provides that a judge may suspend
any unserved portion of a sentence.
3
'Note 5 supra.
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inherent power to suspend,3 2 because the purpose of punishment is rehabilitation. Basically, there are two philosophies of punishment:3 the punitive
philosophy, which contains within it the objectives of protection to society
and revenge; and the therapeutic philosophy, which emphasizes that
government sanction should try to rehabilitate the offender or deter possible future crimes. But is it within the province of the judiciary to say which
purpose should be pursued? This decision would seem to be a matter of
policy for the legislature, which would also be the proper authority to
decide how that purpose might be best implemented. The mandatory tenday sentence stricken in this case may be looked at as a retributive measure; but whatever the purpose, it is an objective which should be decided
upon and implemented by the legislature unless some constitutional limitation would be otherwise violated. Assuming, but not conceding, that the
purpose of a mandatory sentence statute is retribution, the question may
be asked if this is a prohibited purpose under the constitution. Tested
against the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment,3 a mandatory sentence statute has been upheld as constitutional.3
Cases which hold that the power to suspend either imposition or execution of sentence is inherent either rely on faulty reasoning or cite little
authority, 36 or they hold that the power was exercised at common law and
is therefore inherent.3 7 Such analyses seem tenuous. If a power were inherent because it was exercised at common law, many practices which would
seem barbaric to modern society would exist today. However, many states
have alleviated this problem by statutes specifically providing that constitutions and laws passed by the legislature abrogate the common law 3 8 The
problem, as was realized in State v. McCoy, goes deeper than mere substantive law, the fundamental question being whether the act by the legislature deals with substantive law which can be controlled by the legislature, or is "higher" than bare substantive law, in which case the legislature cannot act.
It is extremely difficult to characterize powers as either substantive
3286 P.2d at 251.

1E. JOHNSON,

CRIME, CORRECTION AND SOCIETY 281-86 (rev. ed. 1968).
3'U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-

sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
'"See, e.g., Sperling v. Willingham, 353 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1965) which upheld a mandatory sentence statute as not being cruel and unusual punishment nor violative of equal
protection.
'Chatman v. Page, 484 P.2d 537 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
3People ex reL Forsyth v. Court of Sessions, 141 N.Y. 288, 36 N.E. 386 (1894).
-"E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-116 (1947).

172

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

law or "something more. ' 39 The best approach seems to be that of arguing from implication. The legislature decides what acts of human behavior
shall be unacceptable to society, and therefore punishable as a crime, and
further sets the penalty for the act. It would then be only reasonable to
conclude that the legislature may require that the punishment it has set
be carried into effect. This reasoning is especially true for a crime such
as driving under the influence, which is a creation of statute, that crime
being unknown at common law for obvious reasons. Furthermore, it can
very logically be argued that the power to suspend execution of sentence
is not inherent in the judiciary because the courts could function quite well
without itA0
The foregoing is not to say that there is not a place for the suspended
sentence in the American legal system. Since each case presents a somewhat different factual situation to the court, the flexibility afforded the
judge by the power to suspend sentence is of great value. In some situations, there are valid extenuating circumstances which the court rightly
should take into consideration before fixing punishment. Legislatures
have recognized these problems and have given broad power to suspend,
with capital offenses and recidivist felony convictions being the major
exceptions. 4 t If the powers given by statute were niggardly, then at least
on practical grounds, the argument for inherent power would be stronger.
However, in light of the widespread adoption of statutes granting that
power, there seems little reason for courts to claim or to hold that they
have an inherent power to suspend execution of sentences for an indefinite
period.
JOHN JEFFRIES MILES

3"The power would have to be express, implied or inherent in the constitution, or be
superior to it. However, those claiming the unconstitutionality of mandatory sentence statutes usually rely on the inherency of the power without stating whether the power is inherent
in the constitution or is superior to it.
"If an inherent power is defined to be a power flowing implicitly from the constitution
because the court needs this authority to function properly, and if a court could function
properly without being able to suspend execution, obviously that power is not inherent.
"1E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991a (Supp. 1971).

